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ABSTRACT 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) maintained a lifelong interest in the institutional 
implementation of experimental science. What changed over the years were the 
rhetorical strategies employed to give this project legitimacy. I systematize 
those changes by dividing Bacon's works into three groups according to three 
criteria: what rite of officialization is enacted in each text (e.g., conversión, 
fatherly generation, royal delegation); who the inscribed addressee is (e.g., an 
imagined audience of sympathetic disciples, the monarch, posterity); and what 
the status is of the invoked philosophical, religious, and political authorities. 
In this manner, I isolate three distinct versions of Bacon's rhetoric of 
legitimation. 
1. Charting Legitimation. 
Throughout his writing career Francis Bacon struggled to devise a feasible 
institutionalizing path for the sponsoring of the new utlitarian science and the political 
enfranchisement of its practitioners. By path I mean a succession of choices and actions 
geared toward the same end through the cooperative effort of a community of individuáis. 
The one work in which Bacon outlines step by step the foundational moments that 
constitute a path is the New Atlantis (1623), an uncharacteristic Renaissance utopia 
precisely because an equal amount of attention is given to the articulation of those steps 
in a temporal sequence and to a description of the main features of the society in question. 
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Before the practices that characterize anew society become institutionalized, they must 
acquire sufficient legitimacy by appealing to interest groups that articúlate such practices 
in their discourse as an aspiration of their own or as an accepted deviation. In fact, the 
processes of legitimation and institutionalization usually run parallel to each other. 
Institutionalization does to day-to-day practice what the legitimation of a new idea does 
to a community structured according to a given consensus. Pierre Bourdieu, whose insights 
into the process of symbolic production in rigidly hierarchized political systems have 
strongly influenced my thinking on institutions, acknowledges as much when he writes that 
"an act of institution ... represents a form of officialization and legitimation" (Language 
and Symbolic Power 173). 
Timothy Murray has also outlined a comparison between Habermas' and Bacon's 
respective notions of legitimation. He rightly points out that Habermas' explanation of how 
an ideology of reform is produced is adumbrated in Bacon's major treatises: a symbolic 
producer notices a collectively felt need for change, which he interprets subjectively 
according to his own aspirations yet undertaking such an interpretation in seemingly 
rational terms—in Bacon's case, by means of inductive reasoning and the production of 
utilitarian works (Murray 9).1 If the symbolic producer is to gather enough support for his 
program, he has to make a dominant group acknowledge (as Bacon tries to do with the 
monarchy, represented by James I) that idiosyncratic program as an objective answer to 
the demands of necessity.2 Only under these conditions can the institutionalizing process 
get under way. 
Bacon knew how important it was to créate one such climate of opinión; henee his 
continual cultivation throughout his career of the dedication, the prologue, the publie 
oration, and other short forms conventionally used in the Renaissance to connect a work 
to the larger social context in which it was created and which it meant to influence. These 
shorter pieces can be divided into two groups: the posthumously published orations and 
prefaces (which connect Bacon's project to an imagined community of fellow scientists), 
and the dedications and prefaces introducing Ofthe Advancement and The New Organon 
(which seek the patronage of James I in the realization of the reforms outlined in the two 
treatises). As it is his last work, in the New Atlantis Bacon recapitulates, expands, and 
modifies many ofthe strategies of legitimation that he had employed in his earlier works. 
I anchor my argument on legitimation precisely upon this slim yet highly constructed 
corpus of prefaces, orations, and short fictions. Only there can we trace Bacon's changing 
construction of accepted pragmatic situations with which to advance his otherwise 
subversive ideas. I proceed to examine one such situation in an early text by Bacon to 
illustrate this point and lead my argument into a definition of legitimation applicable to his 
project. 
In the Introductory Narrative of the posthumously published The Refutation of 
Philosophies (1607), a friend tells Bacon that he has just returned from a trip to París, 
where he had listened to a publie oration on the need to de-Aristotelianize and de-
Christianize both scientific research and university education. The friend emphasizes the 
somehow clandestine yet by no means revolutionary nature of the event: "There were 
some fifty men ... all bearing the stamp of dignity and probity ... among them officers of 
state, senators, distinguished churchmen, people from all ranks of life, and foreigners from 
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various nations" (Farrington The Philosophy 104). Throughout his writings Bacon repeats 
such allusions to groups that, while performing services for the monarchy, lived a life of 
inner exile and nonviolent dissent, and were perhaps ready to adhere to an institutional 
program that would enfranchise both the mechanical arts and the emerging class that 
practiced them. 
Some individual groups not unlike the one described by Bacon have been identified 
by intellectual historians, e.g., Mark H. Curtís' underemployed or "alienated intellectuals" 
of Tudor and Stuart England; Hugh Kearney's self-educated artisan mechanics (a group 
Bacon mentions in the Paresceve [1620]); Christopher Hill's semiclandestine London 
astronomers and physicians; and Robert Kargon's atomistic philosophers of the 
Northumberland circle.31 will not argüe that Bacon knew what each group desired or that 
he intended to satisfy their desires; rather, I will focus on his assumption that a new ground 
was being sought from different quarters on which to found what Bacon calis a new 
"correspondentia ingeniorum et mentium" and a "legitimus consensus.4" Such a consensus 
could be induced if a method should be devised that were universally intelligible and used 
a form of empirical proof as the only standard of authenticity and truth. The necessity of 
one such method is suggested as early as in Bacon's first work, The Masculine Birth of 
Time (1603; publ. 1653), where induction-based certainty is figured as "trust":5 
Do you really think it is easy to provide the favorable conditions required for the 
legitimate passing on of knowledge [Lat. modus legitimus scientiae tradendae]! The 
method must be mild and afford no occasion of error. It must have in it an inherent 
power to inspire trust [Lat. vis ínsita et innata ad fidem conciliandam] and a vital 
principie which will stand against the ravages of time, so that the tradition of science 
may mature and spread like some lively vigorous vine. (The Philosophy 62; Works 7.17; 
English trans. emended) 
To be sure, Bacon was all too quick to reduce the aspirations of other groups to the 
twofold objective of his program, Le., to make utilitarian progress the end of all political 
associations, and empirical evidence the standard of truth. In the process of doing just this 
he inevitably mystified his own project as well as its context (note the similarity in 
wording between his phrase "ad fidem conciliandam" and the post-Reformation project 
of a consensus fidelium), but the guiding idea of arriving at a new consensus remained 
unaltered. 
In fact, the notion of consensus or peaceful agreement is central to theories of 
legitimation, as is the rhetoric of persuasión used to bring about such an agreement. 
Bourdieu, for whom symbolic practices can in time alter even a very conservative political 
space, argües that the process of legitimating a new philosophy consists in the progressive 
acceptance of certain practices and ideas in the public domain without their being 
perceived as disturbing the larger social order. Bourdieu is especially interested in how an 
unsanctioned program comes to acquire the necessary legitimacy to become 
institutionalized and even hegemonic.6 Bourdieu's notion of the legitimation process 
revolves around the ability of the advocates of the new set of practices to induce trust in 
the communities they profess to serve, to communicate uninterraptedly with those same 
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communities in understandable terms, and to sublímate their own self-interest as an 
emerging class into the promise of carrying out an interest-free project. 
The issues of trust, communicative competence, and continuity v. change appear very 
prominently in Bacon's early writings. For example, in Thoughts and Conclusions (1607; 
publ. 1653) he expresses his frustration at the fact that at Oxford and Cambridge a 
student's departure from "the works of certain authorities" is still construed as being 
"disturbing and revolutionary." According to Bacon, the practice or study of any type of 
rational empiricism can be considered by many as an act of political sedition or religious 
heresy. He thus argües for using different criteria of validity to judge the legitimacy of 
political and scientific endeavors: 
In politics even improvements are suspect on account of their power to disturb, for civil 
affairs rest on authority, assent, reputation, opinión [Lat. authoritas, consensus, fama, 
opinio], not on demonstration and on truth [demonstratio et veritas]. But in the arts and 
sciences, as in mining for minerals, there ought everywhere to be the bustle of new 
works and further progress. The distinction is right and necessary. (Farrington The 
Philosophy 79; Works 7.110; English trans. emended)7 
The legitimation of the new science by works alone does not suffice; the production of 
those works must be accompanied by an assurance that, rather than undermining the 
legitimacy of the ruling political power, it somehow reinforces it. Henee Bacon's depiction 
of the teaching of science as the love of a father for his son; of the production of works as 
the fruits of a "chaste and legitímate marriage" [Lat. castum et legitimum connubium] {The 
Philosophy 72; Works 7.31-32); of the research into causes and effeets as a Solomonic 
worship of God's creative powers; and of the institutional incorporation of the scientist 
into the state apparatuses as the fulfillment of a calling to serve the monarch and the realm. 
Bacon never ceased to insist that, from the standpoint of epistemology, the long-lasting 
legitimacy of empiricist science rested not upon the authority of ancient texts but upon its 
ability to produce works that would appeal to the human instinct for material comfort and 
self-perpetuation (Valerias Terminus [Works 6.135]).8 The problem with this argument was 
that such works could not be produced overnight and that the overall project might be 
construed as being inimical to the established social order. Consequently, Bacon devotes 
a considerable portion of his writings to designing an institutional path for science that 
incorporates features of the patriarchal family, the Solomonic monarchy, and the Christian 
church.9 In point of fact, he had at his disposal, in the influential writings of the 
Elizabethan theologian, Richard Hooker, an analogical framework that linked together the 
offices of father, priest, governor, king, and God. In the Second Book of The Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity (1593), Hooker lays out two main tenets of his political theory, 
namely, that "all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own homes," 
and that in a "politic society" an individual can acquire this type of "lawful power" only 
by "consent of men, or immediate appointment of God." Yet Hooker obscures the 
possibility of a government by consent at the end of the same paragraph, where in the 
syntactic unfolding of a single subordínate sentence, all four fatherly figures merge into 
one: 
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Which is also (as it seemeth) the reason why the ñame of Father continued still in them, 
who of fathers were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of govemors to do as 
Melchisedec, and being kings to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the 
first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. (191)10 
Although Bacon does not hierarchize authority in exactly the same way as Hooker, his 
avowed plea for implementing a socio-political regime fhat enfranchises individual citizens 
according primarily to merit and utility (what he calis his "conscientia meriti" [Works 
6.450]) is often undermined by the providential religious rhetoric that he uses to lend it 
legitimacy." In devising his own legitimating rhetoric, Bacon oscillates between hisldeal 
of arriving at a "legitimate consensus" based on "legitímate induction" (in Hooker's 
terminology, a "lawful consent"), and his constant recourse to the more widely spread 
phenomenon of patrilinearity, which Bourdieu considers as well a "rite of legitimation."12 
Significantly, in the New Atlantis Bacon depicts an ideal commonwealth, Bensalem, 
where the most respected individuáis are all fatherly figures: King Solamona (its founding 
father), the Fathers of Salomon's House (the ruling élite class of scientists), the Tirsans or 
prolific patriarchs of an extended family, and the governor-priest. Furthermore, Bacon 
imagines in the New Atlantis that the Great Instauration of the sciences will take place 
wifhout disrupting church history and dogma, and without being disturbed by it. Instead, 
the Instauration will be carried out by following to the letter the promise of Solomon's 
early prophecies of material comfort. 
In Bacon's writings, the human creation of a new political order based upon a new 
type of science is often enveloped in the guise of a divinely ordained plan (announced 
prophetically by Moses, Daniel, or Solomon), or placed under the imagined patronage of 
James I, who himself is presented as the English Solomon.13 This rhetorical construction 
was in keeping with James' own self-construction as the establisher of a pax perpetua in 
Britain, as becomes evident in Lancelot Andrews' The Peace-Maker, or Great Brittanies 
Blessing (1619), of which James himself may have written small portions: "Let England 
(the seat of our Solomon) rejoice in her happy government... and she that can set peace 
with others, let her enjoy it herself. We live in Beth-salem, the house of peace, then let us 
sing this song of peace, Beati Pacifici" (qtd. in Willson 271).14 Since medieval times 
Solomon had been construed as the auctor of peace and the auctor of wisdom, precisely 
the two signal achievements with which Bacon endows Bensalem's prophet-king, 
Solamona, in the New Atlantis.15 
2. Bacon's Three Narratives of Institutionalizing. 
Bacon's rhetoric of legitimation evolved throughout his writing career from a vehement 
refutation of the inherited theocentric and aristocratic forms of authority to a compromise 
of sorts with the fatherly authority of god and monarch. Not surprisingly, this development 
parallels Bacon's own political career, from his relative marginalization by Elizabeth (who 
for almost twenty years refused to confer upon him a public office) to his promotion by 
James I to the highest-ranking offices in the realm (appointed Solicitor-General in 1607, 
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Lord Keeper in 1617, and Lord Chancellor in 1618). Since I will make frequent references 
to this parallel development in the remainder of this essay, I now proceed to outline the 
three different versions of Bacon's plotting of a legitímate institutionalizing path. 
Bacon's first versión or narrative is comprised of four very short writings originally 
written in Latín: The Masculine Birth ofTime [Temporis partus masculus] (1603), the 
Preface for the unwritten Of the Interpretation of Nature [De Interpretatione Naturae 
Proemium] (1603), Thoughts and Conclusions [Cogitata et visa] (1607), and The 
Refutation of Philosophies [Redargutio philosophiarum] (1608). I desígnate these texts 
collectively as Bacon's pseudo-autobiographies because in them a first-person voice of 
what appears to be a Baconian philosopher adopts a protagonista stance uncharacteristic 
of analytical writing.16 All four texts were published posthumously, insist that the "dignity 
[of knowledge] is maintained by works of utility and power" [Lat. dignitas scientiae 
utilitatibus et operibus munitur] (Letters and Life 3.86; Works 6.448), and deploy the same 
three-stage institutionalizing narrative: 
1) Working in the solitude of his studio, the founding philosopher conceives, by virtue 
of his very genius, a guiding idea, which he alternately calis his "machine" [Lat. machina] 
and his "fetus" [Lat. foetus] (Works 6.449; 7.58). 
2) This guiding idea or program of reform is defined negatively in contrast to the 
reigning philosophies and institutional constraints that undermine the practice of science, 
and which are severely criticized. Thus, in The Masculine Birth and The Refutation Bacon 
dismisses Plato and Aristotle as mere "sophists" because their respective philosophies 
were not supported by a "serious study and observation of natural phenomena." Aristotle 
is called the "Anti-Christ," because in order to enthrone himself he attempted to destroy 
the ñame and doctrine of his "father[s]," the Presocratics, while Plato is demoted to the 
condition of a "swelling poet" and a "mocking wit" (Farrington The Philosophy 111, 113, 
64). 
3) The instituting idea (the "fetus" or "machine") is entrusted to a select group of 
pupils, to whom the genius delegates the task of keeping alive the institutionalizing 
process, that is, of inducing the "birth of time" or "setting the machine on work" {Works 
6.449; Letters and Life 3.86).17 
This three-stage path remains insufficient as a legitimating strategy in that it does not 
theorize the repositioning of the philosophers from the margins of society (the officer of 
state's prívate studio) to the centers of power. Of equal importance is the fact that it does 
not seek to find points of agreement wifh established discourses or practices, choosing 
ínstead to indict indiscriminately the whole Platonic-Aristotelian tradition in an almost 
apocalyptic tone.18 In effect, in the pseudo-autobiographies, in the posthumously published 
Valerias Terminus, or the Interpretation of Nature (written in 1603), and in his 
commentary on ancient Greek fables, Of the Wisdom of the Ancients [De sapientia 
veterum] (publ. 1609), Bacon makes frequent use of the oracular stance and of Presocratic 
aphorisms. Thisretreat into open-ended interpretation and away from theory suggests both 
his interest in dislodging the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm and his inability to produce 
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in the early stages of his career an institutionalizing narrative that could be granted the 
desired legitimacy.19 
This first narrative overlaps chronologically during a four-year period with Bacon's 
earliest attempts to implement his reforms from above, which began during his tenure 
under James I as King's Counselor (appointed in 1604) and Solicitar General (appointed 
in 1607). Thus, in Ofthe Advancement ofLearning (1605), Bacon repeatedly apostrophizes 
James, constructing him as the wisest of all monarchs, and insisting that the "works or acts 
of merit toward learning" are "opera basílica" a royal task fit only for the mind of the 
English Solomon {Works 6.180). 
The near-synchronicity of Bacon's first and second narratives of institutionalizing (one 
started from below and the other from above) reveáis that, while after James I's accession 
he certainly did not relinquish his anti-Aristotelian biases, he at least was beginning to 
envision the Instauration of the sciences as an enterprise that might be of interest to a 
monarch who fervently desired to make Scholasticism compatible with civil and practical 
learning (Willson 198-99). Bacon appears in Ofthe Advancement not as James' appointed 
counselor in judicial matters (which is what he actually was as King's Counsel), but as his 
self-appointed delégate in legislating a new science. By assuming the non-existent office 
of university reformer in the public and ritual act of the dedication, Bacon began to 
practice what could perhaps be called the performative dimensión of royal (self)-
investiture. 
As he continued to ascend the ranks of the apparatchik, Bacon recast his unpublished 
shorter pieces into the compendious treatise on method, The New Organon, and its 
companion piece on the historiography of science and the división of intellectual labor, the 
Paresceve, both published in a single volume in 1620. As he had done in Of the 
Advancement, in the preface and dedication that precede The New Organon he also 
invokes the fatherly aufhority of monarch and God.20 
A crucial passage for understanding the complex interrelation of the first two 
narratives is to be found in the 1607 Thoughts and Conclusions: 
He [Bacon] proposed a work on the interpretación of nature and on nature itself, designed 
to eradicate errors with the least possible offence and thus to effect a peaceable entry into 
the apprehensions of men. This, he thought, should be all the easier, since he did not 
propose to put himself forward as a leader or guide, but to elicit and spread light from 
nature herself, thus precluding for the future the need of a leader [Lat. ut duce postea non 
sit opus]. (Farrington The Phüosophy 100; Works 7.141) 
The work in question mentioned at the beginning of this passage is in all likelihood The 
New Organon, whose writing was postponed until 1620. What needs to be emphasized 
here is that by 1607 Bacon already knew what his research method would be like, and in 
fact Thoughts and Conclusions contains the first exposition of Bacon's proposed inductive 
method, the Interpretation of Nature.21 At the same time, however, this method was not yet 
presented in a fashion that could "effect a peaceable entry into the apprehensions of men." 
On the contrary, Bacon's earliest writings, had they been published immediately after they 
were written, would have antagonized a great section of his potential audience because of 
170 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
their disrespect for the authority of Aristotle and the Scholastics and their lack of a patrón, 
either civil or ecclesiastical. The publication of The New Organon marked a complete 
reversal of this pragmatic situation, since it happened when Bacon was at the height of his 
influence as Lord Chancellor and could therefore address James I as the authority who had 
commissioned the work (which in actual fact was not the case). 
In a contiguous passage from Thoughts and Conclusions Bacon elaborates on the 
paradox that while his task is almost unrealizable, it is prompted by a sense of urgency: 
Meanwhile time was passing; he was himself immersed beyond his wish in civil 
business; and when he thought on the uncertainty of life, delay became unbearable. He 
felt the need to secure at least some part of his plan, and decided to put forward a simpler 
statement, which, though not published, might yet suffice to prevent the miscarriage [Lat. 
aborturn] of a thing so wholesome. (The Philosophy 100; Works 7.141) 
The "simpler statement" expounding "at least part of his plan" for reforming learning can 
be reconstructed through a joint reading of the four short autobiographies. Note that Bacon 
writes Thoughts and Conclusions in 1607, two years after he published Of the 
Advancement, and that he does not even mention the longer treatise in the autobiography. 
In 1607, the year of his appointment as Solicitor-General, he still asserts that the 
unpublished writings are the ones that represent his "plan" more faithfully. In other words, 
the great treatises by which Bacon is known as the first utilitarian philosopher of 
science—Of the Advancement and The New Organon—recast in more acceptable terms 
the convictions that he voices without censorship in the posthumously published 
autobiographies. 
To recapitúlate the differences outlined thus far: the first institutionalizing narrative 
is predicated on a thorough rejection of Scholastic-Aristotelianism, denies the legitimacy 
of civil or ecclesiastical authorities in the study of empirical truths, and commends the 
success of the project to the uncertain care of posterity, which is hypostatized in the 
persons of the "Sons" or disciples.22 By contrast, the second narrative uses Aristotle as an 
authority, increases the number of citations from Oíd Testament books (only sparingly 
used in the earlier texts), abides by the authority of king and church, and insists that the 
Instauration is a feasible project so long as it is sponsored by a legitímate monarch such 
as James I—the proposed reforms are opera basílica. 
In the dedications of the treatises pertaining to the second narrative of 
institutionalizing, Bacon seeks royal patronage by explaining to James that knowledge is 
produced by means of a patrilinear succession (God delegates to James, who delegates to 
Bacon), and that the kind of learning generated therein simply reflects the "perfect" 
knowledge possessed by James, who carries "a fountain of learning in himself (6.90).23 
Yet the treatise dedicated to James, The New Organon, advocates a form of critical 
legitimation that quite simply contradicts the idealism implicit in the description of James' 
mind: "The intellect is not qualified to judge except by means of induction, and induction 
in its legitímate form" (Works 8.45). "Induction in its legitímate form" denotes the 
workings of the Interpretation of Nature, a phrase which in turn designates both Bacon's 
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master method of research and the process by which the method is put into practice at 
successive stages by a group of scientists. 
This is not how legitimation praxis functioned in early seventeenth-century England. 
On the contrary, it thrived on the appeal to tradition rather than to rational empiricism. 
Murray illustrates this point by citing John Bullokar's An English Expositor: Teaching the 
Interpretation of the Hardest Words (London, 1616) as an instance of what legitímate 
interpretation meant at the time, Le., anything "lawfull, lawfully begotten" (Murray 8). 
Bullokar's phrasing limits the lawful begetting of an idea or a practice to its generation 
according to a preconceived, unalterable pattern, as does Hooker's above-mentioned 
notion of "lawful power by the immediate appointment of God." 
Even if Bacon should shy away from the antagonizing world of The Refutation, he 
would still lack the legitimating power of tradition: "I do not endeavor ... by triumphs of 
confutation, or pleadings of antiquity, or assumption of authority, or even by the veil of 
obscurity, to invest these inventions of mine with any majesty" (Works 8.34). What Bacon 
claims to have developed in The New Organon is a rational method, which he defines as 
a "legitímate, chaste, and severe course of inquiry" (8.52). Chastity and severity are 
transformed into repression in a contiguous passage: "I interpose everywhere admonitions 
and scruples and cautions, with a religious care to eject, repress, and, as it were, exorcise 
every kind of phantasm" (8.50). Commenting upon this very passage, Murray argües 
persuasively that the "Baconian enterprise of critical legitimation" becomes 
"compromise[d]" by Bacon's "passionate prescriptions of ejection and repression," and 
that here the rhetoric of legitimation functions alternately as the "forces of repression" and 
as the "phantasm that evades the critical exorcisms of the new scientist" (Murray 9). In 
other words, the legitimaNaturae Interpretatio, in order to become institutionalized, needs 
to hide its own contingent nature behind the guise of necessity.24 
Murray stresses the repressive strain in Bacon's institutionalizing path as presented in 
the prefaces to The New Organon. This rhetorical movement toward containment can be 
easily traced in all three versions of the narrative. As I explained above, in the first versión 
it takes the form of a marriage and a testament that establish respectively a law of 
generation and a law of succession. These two contracts cooperate in bringing about an 
uninterrupted Une of anonymous intellectual héroes. 
In summary, in the second institutionalizing narrative the Interpretation of Nature 
produces a type of critical legitimation that nevertheless remains insufficient to guarantee 
the success of the institutionalizing process. As aresult, Bacon allows the purity of critical 
legitimation to become contaminated by other strategies of legitimation that range from 
divine and royal imposition to a state-sponsored discipline. 
The third narrative of institutionalizing, the one deployed in the New Atlantis, proposes 
a compromise between the first two. In Bacon's last work, the institutionalizing path does 
not origínate in a genius working in isolation (as in the pseudo-autobiographies), but 
neither is it subjected to the will of a monarch and his court and church (as in Of the 
Advancement). Instead, the New Atlantis features a fatherly king who voluntarily 
withdraws from the political world by establishing a technocratic foundation to whose 
members he delegates his civil power. The members of Salomon's House are called 
Fathers and his disciples Sons, by analogy with other patrilinear orders existing in 
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Bensalem, which they either predate (Christianity) or consciously emulate (the extended 
family of the Tirsan or clan's patriaren and the now-ornamental monarchy). 
In the nation of Bensalem an enlightened and benign despot, Solamona, arranges for 
his own succession and for the aristocracy of blood to step down from executive positions 
of power. At the same time he invests a newly created order of epistemocrats with quasi-
absolutist prerogatives in the issuing of institutional policy, both domestic and foreign. 
Bensalem thus provides an inverted reflection for the England Bacon aspired to reform: 
a nation where each Christian form of observance (Protestant, Catholic, and Puritan) still 
functioned in addition as a rite of varying social and political legitimation; where the 
fatherly first Stuart King dreamed of carrying out his own fantasy of a personal rule;25 
where non-Aristotelian philosophy was rendered suspect due to its association with 
atomism, religious sorcery, and even low drudgery;26 and where types of experimentally 
based science were often not easily reconciled with the respective dogmas of "divines," 
"politiques," and "learned men themselves" (Ofthe Advancement [Works 6.91]).27 In fact, 
to argüe for the realization of God's kingdom on earth (as suggested by the teachings of 
Moses, Solomon, and Daniel) was tantamount to declaring onself a Puritan (Hill 110-12). 
The paradox that Solomon (and in general Oíd Testament prophecy) could at the same 
time serve the interests of Protestants, religious radicáis, and secular scientists was the 
result of an interpretive ambiguity: whereas James and his court eulogists interpret 
Solomon's proverbial knowledge as the moral wisdom that divine providence bestows 
conservatively upon peaceful and lawful kings, Bacon construes it as the knowledge of 
second causes that will allow humankind to control change in the natural world.28 
Clearly, then, Bacon's legitimating rhetoric must aim at the reconciliation of theology 
with natural philosophy, of Theorica with Practica, and ofthe Catholic with the Protestant 
dogma. In the New Atlantis such a reconciliation takes the form of a historicist utopian 
narrative in which a seventeenth-century non-European nation is presented that did not 
experience any of the schisms just mentioned. Two features of Bensalem's institutional 
history in particular relate to this specific conflict of authorities: first, the temporal 
anteriority of experimental science in relation to abstract thought and Christianity 
determined that the Bensalemites had neither a Plato or Aristotle ñor an Augustine or 
Aquinas; and second, a personal decisión of King Solamona institutionalized the 
cultivation of mechanical philosophy and natural history, and minimized the political 
responsibilities of his royal successors and their courts (by disengaging Bensalem from 
world history). The very structuring of the New Atlantis as a series of three first-person 
accounts dealing, respectively, with the Europeans' inability to control nature (this is how 
I read the mariner's account of the near-shipwreck with which the work begins), with the 
course of Bensalem's political history, and with the organization of Salomon's House, 
suggests Bacon's faith in the achievability of a truly utilitarian commonwealth. What is 
more, his use of both historicism and the autoptic or eye-witness stance point to a 
underlying authorial strategy aimed to hide the frictions and contradictions inherent in 
process of historial change.29 
There is no description in the New Atlantis of Bensalem's practice of an 
institutionalized religious worship prior to the Father's interpretation ofthe supernatural 
apparition in Renfusa. The Fathers themselves had no religión, and practiced a 
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predominantly materialist and utilitarian brand of natural philosophy. After the initial 
gesture of delegation by Solamona, they appear to have maintained their legitimacy among 
the non-Fathers in the truly Baconian way, "by works of utility and power." The 
programmatic status of this principie becomes apparent in the central statement contained 
in the Father's relation: '"The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and 
secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the 
effecting of all things possible'" {Works 5.398). Here the word "empire" does not describe 
the perpetuation of a colonial situation in which the group occupying the geographical 
center of an economic and social system dictates the destiny of the groups occupying the 
margins. Rather, it denotes the emancipation of human life from the tyranny of physical 
affliction.30 For Bacon, humankind has always enjoyed the "sovereignty of all inferior 
creatures," and so any kind of knowledge that contributes to increasing the human "power 
and dominión" over nature is legitímate so long as it is immediately "referred to use and 
action" rather than "contemplation" {Valerias Terminas [Works 6.28-29]).31 This dominión 
goes as far back as Moses and Solomon, the two Oíd Testament champions of material 
progress, both of whom play a crucial part in the New Atlantis.32 As Blumenberg writes, 
in Bacon "a concept of human happiness appeared that separated theory from existential 
fulfillment by reducing the necessary knowledge to the amount fixed by the requirements 
of domination over natural reality" (239).33 
3. Conclusión: Bacon, James I, and the Solomonic Experiment. 
Since I have argued that the position of originator of the institutionalizing process is 
occupied alternately by Bacon (in the first versión of the narrative) and James I (in the 
second versión), it is only fitting that I should conclude this essay by suggesting the way 
Bacon may have desired James to read the New Atlantis. In the dedication part of The 
Advancement James had been construed as the English Solomon on the basis that his 
person embodied the "triplicity" of "king," "priest," and "philosopher" {Works 3.88, 90).34 
Because these are also Solamona's offices, the Bensalemite king can be considered both 
a type of James and an anti-type or successor of the biblical Solomon. Solamona had 
responded to Bensalem's need for a strong legislator who could créate a new consensus 
and ensure its future preservation. 
The experience of reading Bacon's own foundational fiction—the New Atlantis—was 
to provide James I with specific instructions on how to fulfill, in his own self-proclaimed 
role as proverbial Rex pacificus of the Protestant world, the Solomonic destiny to which 
he felt called. Bacon hails James as the subject and agent of his own Solomonic 
instauration in three different ways. First, as head of both Church and State, James has the 
power to realize the Danielesque prophecy of a coming Golden Age of scientific 
exploration—the works of the Instauration are opera basílica, as Bacon writes in Ofthe 
Advancement and the Paresceve.35 Second, like Solomon and Solamona, James can 
literally monumentalize his ñame in the stone of a temple of science—the stone, that is, 
of another Salomón's House. Perhaps even more importantly, by both industrial and 
spiritual works James can also control the historical destiny of his own succession. Bacon 
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expressed his concern about the imminence of a bloody religious revolution in the four-
page Preface, a text which ironically remained unpublished until after the Caroline 
Restoration. Read in conjunction with the account of Solamona's achievements, the 
Preface offers a set of instructions as how to preclude a regicide in the Stuart dynasty, and 
along the way, it also proposes a substitute for monarchical power by arguing for the 
empowerment of a new class of college-educated epistemocrats. For Solamona's 
descendants seem to have survived and multiplied all the way up to the seventeenth 
century, even though their court remains cut off from public business and their ñames are 
not even mentioned in any of the numerous narrative fhreads that make the New Atlantis. 
Similarly, when in the first institutionalizing narrative Bacon addresses the scientists 
of the future, he offers them the same gift of continuity in exchange for the erasure of their 
ñames from the text of the future. They must pay with their own ñames for the survival of 
their lineage. Bacon's "beatissima proles Heroum" {The Masculine Birth [Works 7.31]) 
is a lineage of anonymous subjects living outside of epic history, which in Bensalem was 
given closure by ancient Solamona, and in England might perhaps be cancelled out by 
James, "thus precluding for the future the need of a leader" (Thoughts and Conclusions 
[Farrington The Philosophy 100]). 
From the very first narrative it is quite clear that the goal of Bacon's distancing from 
Aristotelianism is not the unconditional reléase of critical interpretation. In all three 
versions of the narrative, as Bacon's method and reform plans become institutionalized, 
they attempt to drive all their opponents from the field of interpretation. Aristotle's 
dictatorship is thus replaced by Bacon's method, which he compares to a "Spartan 
testament" [Lat. haereditas Spartana] because it is designed to "equalize men's wits and 
faculties" (The Refutation [Farrington The Philosophy 118; Works 7.77]).36 This proposed 
Spartan discipline will leave all his successors letter-bound, that is, enslaved to the letter 
of the law.37 Bacon's philosophy of science is an emphatically patriarchal institution 
designed to reproduce endlessly not only the desired alterations of natural phenomena, but 
also a rigid hierarchy of producers and consumers of learning.38 Patriarchal structures 
characterize Bacon's projected methods for both acquiring new knowledge and safely 
transmitting it. The question of whether Bacon liked patriarchy may well lack a definite 
answer. What seems indisputable, however, is that the type of critical thinking he 
advocates in the first narrative challenges the primacy of abstract fheoretical and 
philological learning over experimentation. It also threatens the monopoly of science kept 
by patriarchal institutions such as the Protestant Church and the universities. 
The main question to be asked in the light of Bacon's proto-Enlightenment perspective 
is as follows: could he have presented critical legitimation in a radically diferent way, that 
is to say, uncontaminated by the same discourses that it aimed to dislodge in the first 
place? It would be difficult to argüe that he could, since the legitimation of either a new 
praxis or a new discourse in early-seventeenfh-century England required a favorable 
climate of opinión, which in turn could be best induced by invoking the more recognizable 
patriarchal authorities of God and monarch. 
The greatest paradox built into Bacon's efforts to legitímate his reform plans and 
implement the new institutions of science lies in the presentation of his interpretive 
machine enveloped in organicist metaphors. On the one hand, Bacon voices his analytical 
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and empiricist imperatives in statements such as "the dignity of knowledge is maintained 
by works of utility" (Preface) and "the intellect can only judge by means of induction in 
its legitímate form" (The New Organori). On the other hand, however, this program of 
critical legitimation is ultimately deflatedby Bacon's unremitting recourse to patrilinearity. 
If the organization of science is like the organization of the family, and the production of 
works like filial procreation, then a commonwealth, in order to perpetúate itself, only needs 
to strengthen the institutions of the family and its existing patrilinear correlatives. This 
emphasis suited very well the conservative philosophy of government upheld by James I, 
who in Bacon's long and flattering dedications and apostrophes could only see yet another 
testimony of his own Solomonic stature. 
Notes 
1. Among the most useful short accounts of Bacon's project of critical interpretation are 
Daston; Reiss, especially chs. 5 and 6; and Blumenberg, especially. ch. 7 of Part I and Intro. to 
Part III. Some of the ideas found in Blumenberg and Reiss are summarized in Bender & Wellbery 
6-8. For the political implications of the proposed new interpretive machine, see ch. 3 of Hill; and 
Farrington Francis Bacon. 
2. This point is made in Habermas 10. Despite its intended applicability to exclusively late-
capitalist societies, Habermas' treatment of legitimation parallels Bourdieu's. Thus, for instance, 
Habermas stresses that the speech acts of legitimation transform the "subjectivity of opinión" of 
an élite group into general interests; Bourdieu that they represent primarily the élite group that 
pronounces them, whether this is composed of priests, government technocrats, or aspiring 
scientists. Habermas warns that what is "general" is often perceived as "objective"; Bourdieu that 
socially accepted realities become in time "natural" ones. Finally, both stress the role of linguistic 
utterances in creating, fulfilling, or transforming the "expectations" (Habermas) or "habitus" 
(Bourdieu) of an audience. 
3. See Works Cited for complete references. For similar groups in a broad European context, 
see Mandrou; and Grafton. Pocock makes the same argument for specifically religious dissenters 
who occupied positions of responsibility in the English administrative system on the eve of the 
Civil War: "the English saint was not radically alienated from the secular order, but on the 
contrary radically involved in it... The crucial moment will be that at which God's Englishman, 
having mitially believed that his nation was elect of the intensity of his involvement in its 
institutions, comes to believe that some or all of these institutions are unworthy of the work to 
which the nation is elect" (346-47; emphasis in the original). Lastly, on an individual's 
simultaneous membership in two or more mutually conflicting intellectual and political groups, 
see Roots. 
4. For the earliest occurrences of these two revealing phrases, see respectively the Preface for 
the unwritten De Interpretatione Naturae {Letters and Life 3.87; Works 6.449) and The Refutation 
of Philosophies (Farrington The Philosophy 114; Works 7.71). Throughout this essay, whenever 
two parenthetical page references are given at the end of a quotation or a paraphrase from Bacon, 
the first one refers to the English versión of a Latin text and the second one to the Latin original. 
5.See in this connection Giddens' gloss on Georg Simmel's definition of "trust" as "'weak 
inductive knowledge,'" a situation (says Giddens) "in which the confidence vested in probable 
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outcomes expresses a commitment to something rather than just a cognitive understanding" (26-
27). 
6.1 use "hegemony" in the sense employed by McLellan, who in turn dwells on Gramsci's 
adaptation from Lenin and Lukács. A dominant social group becomes hegemonic when it ceases 
to "struggle for its own narrow interests" to constrae itself publicly as "the representative of the 
interests of society as a whole" (31). 
7. Here Bacon seems to echo Plato's concern (in The Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws) 
with finding a self-evident form of demonstration capable of defeating both persuasión and 
argument (the orator and the politician's weapons), and consequently of supporting the 
phílosopher's claim to the highest form of authority. On this Platonic argument, see Arendt 104-
09. Arendt uses the term "authority" in the sense Bacon uses "legitimacy," to denote the pre-
Hegelian principie of peaceful coerción by which one free individual affects the decisions and 
actions of another with the two of them being aware of both their mutual freedom to choose and 
the relation of subjection built into the consensus between them. 
8. This concern corresponds to what White calis "Baconian charity" (21). 
9. The argument deployed in the preceding two paragraphs is meant to indicate that my 
understanding of Baconian legitimation departs from Reiss' notion of Baconian "legitimacy." As 
Reiss' choice of word shows, he is more interested in the acquired legitímate status of a method 
and a discourse than in the institutonalizing process from which that legitimacy emerges. Noting 
the many occurrences of the word "legitimus" in Bacon's earlier short pieces, Reiss argües that 
for Bacon '"[l]egitimacy' has to do both with truth as an adequation of words, concepts, and 
things (that is, with correspondence—or reference), and with the logical system capable of 
rendering such adequation (that is with coherence—or analysis)" (220). 
10. The consideration of king, goventor, and father as essentially interchangeable offices 
resurfaces in James I's 1597 Trew Law of Free Monarchies (Political Works 55). Willson notes 
the King's admiration for Hooker's great work (199). 
11. Pocock, in ch. 3 of The Machiaveüian Moment, presents a magisterial account of the uses 
of prophecy in Renaissance Italy to promote the creation of a secular regime based upon pre-
Christian notions of Militas and the vita activa. For instances of a similar prophetic rhetoric being 
used by both the dominating and the dominated groups coexisting in the same political space, see 
Zagorin 140-71. 
12. For Bourdieu, the social regime based primarily on patrilinearity, which he calis 
"patriarchalism," is founded on an undeclared paradox: "by a permanent denial of self-interest, 
[it] transforms the relation of domination into an enchanted relation" (Language 128). A very 
useful account of patriarchy in seventeenth-century England appears in Schochet, especially 37-98. 
More recently Goldberg has defined "patriarchalism" as "a regular feature of family life in which 
the natural event of procreation becomes an extensión of male prerogative and male power" 
("Fatherly Authority" 16). 
13. In addition to the Oíd Testament prophet and philosopher, we find three Solomonic kings 
in Bacon's writings: Henry VII, who had to overeóme great odds in order to institute the Tudor 
dynasty (Works 11.354); James I, whose claim to Solomonic stature I discuss below; and 
Solamona, the Bensalemite king who established a New Atlantis by delegating his power to a caste 
of utilitarian scientists (New Atlantis [Works 5.380-83). White discusses the relation of Bacon's 
History of the Reign of Henry VII to his attempts to fashion James as the first English Solomon 
to become interested in natural philosophy (see ch. 4 of his book). For an overview of the various 
topoi of natural philosophy, political wisdom, and religious leadership that converge on the figure 
of Solomon, see Conway. 
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14. Thomas Elyot had celebrated Solomon as the proverbial Rex pacificus in a well-known 
passage from The Governor (1531), under the section heading "Of sapience, and the definition 
thereof' (218-21). A letter of 1606 by John Harrington describes in detail the conceit staged at 
court in honor of the Danish King, and which consisted in "the representation of Solomon's 
Temple and the coming of the Queen of Sheba" (39). 
15. Minnis explains how in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (thanks largely to the 
exegetical efforts of Bonaventure and of the Oxford Dominican, Robert Holcot) Solomon emerged 
as the auctor or engenderer of wisdom, and by extensión of all sapiential books written by his 
posterity (94-96). See also Arendt's important distinction (which she attributes to Pliny) between 
auctor—the inspirer of a large-scale enterprise—and artifex—the actual builder or composer of 
a thing (122). On James' fantasy of becoming the driving forcé of England's literary tradition (in 
fact, its auctor), see Goldberg James 117-27. 
16.1n one of these pieces, Thoughts and Conclusions, the autobiographical voice is articulated 
in a more impersonal way by using the passive voice in a discourse that nevertheless conveys the 
"thoughts" and "resolutions" of a passionate philosopher. 
17. For a reading that complements my own, emphasizing the generation of a "new universe 
of discourse" rather than the consensus between master and pupil, see Reiss 221-22. More 
recently, the master-pupil relationship in The Masculine Birth has been construed along 
homoerotic Unes by Hammill (243-45). 
18. Farrington has summarized the reasons behind Bacon's aversión to classical Greek 
philosophy. His hostility toward Aristotle "has two sources, the corruption of Christian doctrine 
by metaphysics and the corruption of science by a logic fertile in arguments but barren of useful 
arts. Bacon is not attempting a sober estímate of an historical figure. It is a living inñuence which 
he attacks" (Farrington The Philosophy 35). As for (Neo)Platonism, it failed to provide manual 
laborers and commoners in general with a sense of active participation in the advancement of the 
commonwealth; on the contrary, it simply "supplied the élite of wealth and birth with the ideal of 
an aristocratic type of state and with an aristocratic culture" {The Philosophy 35). 
19. White was the first scholar to note Bacon's abhorrence of the Greek notion of theoria and 
his corresponding embracement of a Hebraicizing notion of interpretatio (20-21). Two recent 
philosophical assessments of this polarity are to be found in Rosen 147, 162; and Atkins 43-48, 
53-55. 
20. A letter from James I thanking Bacon for his dedication of The New Organon in 1620 
shows that the King had understood Bacon's request (in Ofthe Advancement and in New Organon) 
that new "seats and places of learning" or research apparatuses be endowed by the Crown (Works 
6.173). Thus, in his letter James feels momentarily compelled to assert that he "will give a due 
commendation to such places as in [his] opinión shall deserve it" (Letters 375). There is no record 
of such a commendation. Furthermore, in his biography of James, Willson gives several examples 
of the King's habit of promising endowments and other forms of patronage to various institutions, 
and of forgetting those commitments just as frequently. 
21. Bacon worked on different versions ofthe Interpretation of Nature (on a strictly theoretical 
basis) from the very beginning of his writing career, and produced a total of four formulations, in 
Thoughts and Conclusions (Farrington The Philosophy 98-100; Works 7.138-40), Valerius 
Terminus (6.43-44), The New Organon (8.135-39), and New Atlantis (5.409-11). For a devastating 
and erudite critique of some important shortcomings of Bacon's method that rendered it 
inadequate to produce a scientific revolution, see Jardine 147-49. A more sympathetic account 
appears in Cohén, who states that "Bacon revolutionized the philosophy of science, but he 
certainly did not produce a Baconian revolution in science" (150). 
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22. The ideologue's refusal to subject himself to the judgment of his contemporaries, choosing 
instead the verdict of posterity is an acknowledged feature of the Enlightenment ethos (Becker 
140-43). 
23. Bacon goes on to say that he hopes he "may excite [his] princely cogitations to visit the 
excellent treasure of [his] own mind, and thence to extract particulars agreeable to [his] 
magnanimity and wisdom" {Works 6.91). The "purpose" is specified in the same paragraph as "the 
advancement of learning." "Advancement" could not possibly be understood by James as meaning 
reform, since the contents of his mind are here posited as being already complete and flawless. 
24. This sentence is indebted to Godzich's brilliant discussion of how an emerging institution 
tends to repress its origin as an accepted yet arbitrary deviation from an earlier institution. 
25. "[F]atherly authoritie" is James I' own phrase in Basilikon Doron {Political Works 4), 
where he characteristically equates his biological paternity (the work is addressed to his first-born, 
Prince Charles) with his royal prerogative. Goldberg notes that "in the preface to Basilikon Doron 
[James] wrote as if from the grave, declaring that his book was his last will and testament" 
("Fatherly Authority" 12). Both Bacon and James conceived of themselves as auctores in the 
Solomonic sense of someone who engenders wisdom with a view to instituting a genealogy of 
wise men. 
26.See Quinton 83-84. Hill notes that the contemporaries who shared some of Bacon's ideas 
also amounted to "a list of the leaders of the opposition in the Long Parliament" (99). 
27. This claim is supported by Le Goff 159-63; and Kearney 80-88. For the contrary 
argument, see Grafton 1-5. For the polarity of Theorica and Practica, see Berger 92-94. 
28. The locus classicus of Solomon's excessive love of wordly pleasures appears in Book III 
of Augustine's On Christian Doctrine 97-98. Ginzburg provides a good discussion of the two 
meanings alternately attributed to the Greek epistéme and the Latín sapere in biblical exegesis. 
29 .This procedure corresponds to what Bourdieu calis the "sovereign viewpoint," which 
substitutes the "observer's relation to practice for the practical relation to practice," thus inducing 
an effect of "totalization" {The Logic of Practice 27, 34, 86). Pagden uses the Aristotelian 
category, "autoptic," to denote the "I'Veye-witness stance that we often find in early modern 
philosophical and judicial texts, and in narratives of conquest and exploration. The autoptic 
enunciator disengages himself from the weight of custom or tradition that imposes on him certain 
interpretive constraints, choosing instead to rely on what he claims is his first-hand experience (51 -
53). 
30. See Blumenberg 105-07. Knapp, in his authoritative survey of English Renaissance 
fictions of empire, explains that Bacon's references to the enterprise of America do not argüe for 
•ñor against a specific imperial policy, and therefore do not suggest that Bacon was as interested 
in colonial expansión as he was in scientific discovery (245-48). The contrary view is held by 
Martin, who goes so far as to claim that Bacon's reformed natural philosophy was but a means 
toward his "passion and great project" for establishing "an imperial Britain" (135). Two instances 
of a one-sided reduction of Baconian science to a project of subjection and surveillance appear in 
Horkheimer & Adorno 3-8; and in ch. 5 of Archer. 
31. My reading of this passage is indebted to Blumenberg 386-87. An earlier versión of 
Bacon's argument appears in Meditationes Sacrae (1597), where he makes his famous statement, 
"knowledge itself is power" [Lat. ipsa scientia potestas est] {Works 14.95; 79). In both works 
contemplation is equated with heresy, as if to emphasize Bacon's awareness that his project may 
be construed by some as subversive of the extant religious orthodoxy. 
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32. Auerbach has discussed the problematics involved in the early Christian readings of Oíd 
Testament prophecies as promises of material comfort as well as Augustine's efforts to sublímate 
them into promises of spiritual salvation (39-42). 
33. The same idea appears in Blumenberg 106. There he also argües that the seventeenth-
century concept of progress did not result from the secularization of a Christian eschatology, but 
rather was deeply rooted in pagan Greek and Román philosophy. For the contrary view, 
specifically within the English context, see Hill 93. 
34. In the Epistle Dedicatory of The New Organon Bacon tells James I that he "resembles 
Solomon in so many things—in the gravity of [his] judgments, in the peacefulness of [his] reign 
[and] in the noble variety of the books which [he has] composed" {Works 8.23). 
35. Bacon paraphrases Daniel's prophecy of discovery (as is enunciated in Daniel 12.4) in 
Valerius Terminus, The Refutation, and The New Organon (Works 6.32; 7.93; 1.304-05). English 
translations of the pertinent passages in the last two works appear in Farrington The Philosophy 
131-32; and Works 8.130. 
36. Similarly, in Valerius Terminus Bacon claims that "the course of interpretation now 
propounded ... doth in fact equal men's wits" (Works 6.73). 
37. In the Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes uses the metaphor of the Spartan legislation 
to argüe, like Machiavelli and Bacon, that the laws drawn up by a single legislator, "tendfing] 
toward the same end," are more suitable for a utilitarian regime (88). In The Discourses (1517; 
publ. 1531), Machiavelli writes that "though one man alone is fit for founding a government, what 
he has founded will not last long if it rests upon his shoulders alone; it is lasting when it is left to 
the care of many and when many desire to maintain it" (201). 
38. Theorists of the institutionalizing process agree on singling out "reproduction" as a crucial 
function developed by institutions in order to ensure their own perpetuation (Bourdieu 137-38; 
Godzich 157). 
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